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Introduction
There are different kinds of manager compensation structures in the mutual fund industry. While fixed salaries promise managers unconditional earnings, variable components make the compensation dependent on factors like fund performance or assets under management. In most cases, there is asymmetric information between the fund managers and investors. Therefore, agency conflicts may occur. The design of a fund manager compensation structure can increase or decrease the severity of agency conflicts. Thus, the compensation structure of a mutual fund should depend on the existence of agency conflicts between investors and fund management.
Aims of your paper
The paper should focus, among others, on the following questions: What are common compensation models for US mutual fund managers? How does the compensation structure relate to the intensity of agency conflicts and other characteristics? Does the compensation structure influence fees and fund performance? Present the methodological approach, structure and results of the Ma et al. (2019) paper critically
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